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Abstract 
When magicians perform spectacles that seem to defy the laws of nature, they do so by 
manipulating psychological reality. Hence, the principles underlying the art of conjuring are 
potentially of interest to psychological science. Here, we argue that perceptual and cognitive 
principles governing how we experience hidden things and reason about them play a central role in 
many magic tricks. Different from tricks based on many other forms of misdirection, which require 
considerable skill on the part of the magician, many elements of these tricks are essentially self-
working because they rely on automatic perceptual and cognitive processes. Since these processes 
are not directly observable, even experienced magicians may be oblivious to their central role in 
creating strong magical experiences and tricks which are almost impossible to debunk, even after 
repeated presentations. We delineate how insights from perceptual psychology provide a framework 
for understanding why these tricks work so well. Conversely, we argue that studying magic tricks 
that work much better than one would intuitively believe provides a promising heuristic for charting 
unexplored aspects of perception and cognition.  
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Introduction 
 
“Again there was surprise and amusement, now at the paradoxical duality of the 
experience: what was visually appearing to be true, was simultaneously known as being 
false” (Nielsen, 2008, p. 1505). 
 
In stage magic, conjurers create magical experiences by fooling the minds and the senses of their 
audience, and they are highly successful in doing so. Indeed, when enjoying a good magical show, 
spectators often say that they “cannot believe their eyes”. Because magicians manipulate perceptual 
and cognitive reality (rather than physical reality), it seems evident that psychologists should be 
highly interested in what they do and why it works. Yet, as several authors have pointed out, this 
potentially rich source of psychological insights has been largely untapped by academic psychology 
(Kelly, 1980; Gregory, 1986; Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008; Macknik, King, Randi, & Robbins, 
2008; Rensink & Kuhn, 2015; Thomas et al., 2015), and the scientific investigation of the 
psychological principles exploited by practicing magicians has only recently developed into a 
focused and coherent research program. 
The most obvious link between stage magic and psychological research is the area of visual 
attention (Lamont, Henderson, & Smith, 2010, p. 19), and the rather surprising effectiveness and 
robustness of many magical routines can be understood in light of psychological research on change 
blindness and inattentional blindness (see Memmert, 2010; Kuhn & Tatler, 2011, for debate on 
relationship between inattentional blindness and misdirection). Research on change blindness 
(Rensink, O'Regan & Clark, 1997; Simons & Levin, 1997; Simons & Rensink, 2005) demonstrates 
that quite dramatic changes in a visual scene, which are readily noticeable if they occur in isolation, 
are extremely difficult to detect if they are accompanied by synchronous motion signals in other 
regions of the scene. Similarly, research on inattentional blindness (Mack & Rock, 1998) shows that 
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rather conspicuous changes near to or even at the point of fixation – that is, right in front of our eyes 
– mostly go unnoticed if the observer is attending to something else.  An important feature of this 
line of research, which undoubtedly has contributed much to its huge impact in cognitive science 
and appeal to the general public, is that it demonstrates a striking failure of visual metacognition 
(Levin, 2002). That is, it reveals a huge gap between what we actually perceive and what we 
intuitively believe we are able to perceive. 
To the practicing magician, such failures of visual metacognition provide an excellent tool for 
producing a strong magical experience (Kuhn et al., 2014).  If you can prevent the spectators from 
seeing something they are confident they would be able to see if it happened, you have a unique 
opportunity to do something that they will firmly believe never happened. For instance, as the 
findings of Kuhn, Tatler, Findlay and Cole (2008) show, you can let a cigarette fall into your lap 
right in front of their eyes, but they will typically fail to notice it if you have directed their attention 
elsewhere. Since the spectators firmly believe that they would notice such an obvious event 
occurring right in front of their eyes, they will later have a very hard time figuring out why the 
cigarette is no longer in the hand where it is supposed to be. 
Performing a trick based on attentional misdirection typically requires considerable skill on the part 
of the magician, but it also requires a considerable amount of boldness. This boldness is needed 
because the idea that you can let a cigarette fall into your lap in plain view without anybody 
noticing is highly counter-intuitive. Accordingly, novice conjurers, who still rely on their natural 
intuitions, are often tormented with ‘magician’s guilt’, i.e. the fear that the spectators will 
immediately notice how the trick is done. More experienced conjurers coach their apprentices not 
only by providing advice on how to improve their technical skills of misdirection, but also simply 
by ensuring them that their intuitive fear of getting caught is largely unwarranted. Indeed, learning 
to let go of this intuitive fear is often regarded as an important stage in the development of aspiring 
magicians, which makes them more confident, and in turn, more successful in actually performing 
the technical aspects of the misdirection in a convincing way. With increased practice and 
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experience, magicians learn to overcome their natural intuitions. However, while misdirection is 
easier than one would intuitively expect, the skill and technique of the magician nevertheless often 
play a pivotal role. 
The purpose of the present paper is to draw attention to a largely neglected factor in magic, which 
we believe is of great practical and theoretical importance, but tends to escape the attention of 
magicians because it is, to a much greater extent than many other forms of misdirection (see Kuhn 
et al, 2014, for an overview), independent of the magician’s skill. Because this factor exerts its 
influence without any effort on the part of the magician, it tends to go unnoticed. Ironically, another 
reason why this factor is easily missed or underestimated is that it is even more powerful, robust 
and foolproof than many other forms of misdirection (such as attentional misdirection, for instance): 
The magician hardly needs to think about it because it almost always works. 
The factor we have in mind is our intuitive experience of and reasoning about hidden things. It is 
obvious that the hiding of objects plays a central role in magic. When objects magically materialize 
it is mostly because they were kept well hidden just before, and when they magically disappear it is 
mostly because the magician suddenly hides them (Gibson, 1982).  What is not so obvious, though, 
is that our experience of hidden things is much more strongly determined by automatic perceptual 
and cognitive heuristics beyond our conscious control than we intuitively believe and that these 
automatic processes constrain our conscious thinking and impede our problem-solving abilities. At 
the level of conscious reasoning, we all know that we cannot know for certain what might or might 
not be hidden behind an object in the foreground. However, automatic perceptual and cognitive 
processes induce intuitive beliefs or gut-feelings about the presence or absence of things behind an 
occluder that are so strong and convincing that we do not even consider questioning them, even 
though they might well be wrong (and, in the case of magic tricks, usually are). 
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Experiencing hidden things: The counter-intuitive phenomenon of amodal 
completion  
Our current scientific understanding of these automatic processes owes much to the pioneering 
research of Michotte (Michotte, Thinès, & Crabbé, 1964/1991) and Kanizsa (1979) on a 
phenomenon they called amodal completion. An example of this phenomenon is shown in Fig. 1. 
The hardly identifiable fragments shown in panel (a) are immediately and effortlessly perceived as 
complete B’s in panel (b). Furthermore, one has a strong feeling that the parts of the B’s hidden 
behind the ink blot in panel (b) are ‘really there’ although they are invisible and may, in actual fact, 
very well be absent. If one were to remove the ink blot and see nothing behind them but gaps 
between the visible fragments (as in panel (a)) one would be thoroughly surprised, although one 
must admit that this is logically possible. The curious feeling that the hidden parts of the B’s are 
really there, although they are not seen in the literal sense of the word, is traditionally described by 
saying that they are ‘amodally present’ (Michotte, Thinès, & Crabbé, 1964/1991). The historical 
reasons for the Michotte et al.’s (1964/1991) choice of the term ‘amodal’ are of limited interest here. 
Essentially, the term just serves to indicate the curious feeling that the hidden parts are really there 
and that they have a definite shape, although they are obviously not experienced in quite the same 
way as directly visible object regions1.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 1 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
All extant theories of this phenomenon appeal to various more or less literal incarnations of the idea 
that the visual system somehow completes the directly visible parts of objects via some kind of 
extrapolation of contours, surfaces or volumes.  Hence, one traditionally speaks of amodal 
completion (van Lier & Gerbino, 2015). Next, we shall consider some examples of how this general 
                                                
1 The interested reader may refer to Michotte, Thinès, & Crabbé (1964/1991) for more details about this definition. 
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phenomenon is exploited in magic tricks and how it impedes our ability to figure out how the tricks 
work.  
Fig. 2(a,b) illustrates the well-known Gestalt principle of good continuation (Wertheimer, 
1923/2012). When the two patterns in Fig. 2(a) are brought into register, a radical perceptual 
reorganization is experienced, where a curved wave pattern superimposed on a square wave pattern 
suddenly pops out. The essential idea here is that the visual system tends to group contour elements 
together when one contour element is a “good continuation” of the other. This general principle (or 
its modern incarnations, e.g. Kellman & Shipley, 1991) is thought to underlie many cases of amodal 
completion. If you cover the central X-shaped part of the “triangle” in Fig. 2(c) (say, with your 
thumb), you will have the impression of a complete regular triangle behind your thumb. This may 
be said to occur because such a regular triangle is the smoothest and most natural continuation of 
the visible contours. Similarly, if you cover up the central part of the two curves in Fig. 2(d), you 
will have the experience of a complete cross. Again, this is the simplest continuation of the visible 
contours. Note that these experiences are quite compelling even though you know very well that 
there is no complete triangle (in panel c) or cross (in panel d) behind your thumb. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 2 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Based on this principle, it is quite easy to create a stunning spoon-bending illusion.  As illustrated in 
Fig. 3, the simple secret behind the trick is to use a spoon which has already been bent in advance as 
well as a spare spoon-handle already cut off from another spoon. By aligning the spoon-head of the 
bent spoon with the spare handle and hiding the point of contact and the handle of the bent spoon 
behind your fingers you create the illusion of a single straight spoon. Working from there, you just 
let the spare spoon-handle fall slowly into the palm of your hand by releasing the pressure of your 
fingers. Once it is down in your hand you pull the bent spoon out with your other hand and show it 
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to the audience. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 3 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Many other magic tricks rely on the same principle. Barnhart (2010) mentions a few examples, such 
as the Chinese linking ring routine2, in which solid rings appear to link and unlink by magically 
passing through each other. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the main secret behind the trick is that one of the 
rings actually has a gap in it. When this gap is occluded by the magician’s hand, however, it 
amodally completes into an unbroken ring (Fig. 4b). 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 4 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Note that attentional misdirection plays at best only a subordinate role in these tricks . Nevertheless, 
they seem to create magical experiences which are no less impressive than those evoked by tricks 
where attentional misdirection is the main factor (even though the secrets behind these tricks are 
disappointingly simple once you know them). Indeed, they may be even more difficult to debunk 
because it will be of little use to change what you attend to when viewing the trick a second time. It 
is also interesting to consider that with tricks based on attentional misdirection, every sense of 
magic is lost once you know how the trick works. In the aforementioned cigarette trick, for 
instance, knowing that the magician just drops the cigarette into his lap in plain view will make you 
notice this. The tricks based on amodal completion, in contrast, retain a certain residual magical 
quality even when you know what is going on. Even though you know that the spoon is not 
complete, it still looks very convincingly like a complete spoon. Magicians sometimes refer to this 
kind of residual magic as “eye candy” and use it in entertaining “visual jests” (Ortiz, 2006). The art 
                                                
2 see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnMcuODZ-UY, movie last accessed on Jan. 16th, 2016. 
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of the magician/comedian The Amazing Johnathan, for instance, is replete with excellent examples 
of this. 
A further instructive example is the knife-through-arm routine3, in which the magician creates the 
illusion of cutting through his own arm. Although this trick is extremely compelling (and repulsive), 
the basic underlying method is very simple: A portion of the blade is cut out to make room for the 
arm (Fig. 5(a,b)). This example is theoretically slightly more complicated than the previous ones, 
because it involves two competing tendencies to good continuation: Smooth continuation of the 
blade versus smooth continuation of the arm. At first blush, one may be tempted to assume that the 
former dominates the latter due to our explicit knowledge of the world: We know that flesh is softer 
and more likely to be cut by a knife than the other way around. Contrary to this seemingly plausible 
explanation, however, the illusion persists if the knife is substituted by a banana and the arm is 
substituted by a brick (see Fig. 5(c)). As shown by Gerbino and Zabai (2003), who created the 
banana-through-brick illusion, which of the two objects is perceived to penetrate the other seems to 
be determined by idiosyncratic heuristics more characteristic of perceptual processing than rational 
thought. Essentially, they found a) that the object which is on top tends to penetrate the other and b) 
that the smaller object tends to penetrate the other. These tendencies do not only explain why the 
knife is perceived to penetrate the arm but also why the banana is perceived to penetrate the brick. 
Vrins, de Wit and van Lier (2009) have presented evidence that perceived material hardness may 
also play a certain role, in the sense that soft materials are more readily perceived as being 
penetrated. In the case of the knife-through-arm routine, this can be expected to enhance the illusion 
further.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 5 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
                                                
3 see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eDCHC01VVo, movie last accessed on Jan. 16th, 2016. 
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The immediate and almost visceral nature of the illusion is nicely demonstrated in The Amazing 
Jonathan’s brilliant performance of it4. Even before the trick starts, Jonathan starts yelling to the 
audience—“it’s a trick, it’s a trick”. Yet, the audience not only perceives the knife to penetrate the 
arm, they also experience it as utterly real (Michotte, 1991; Mausfeld, 2013; Leddington, in press) 
and correspondingly repulsive.  
 
Although most of the early research on amodal completion focused on the completion of image 
contours, the general phenomenon is not limited to the completion of image contours and objects 
occluded by other objects in the foreground. Rather, in so-called amodal volume completion (Tse, 
1999; van Lier, 1999; van Lier & Wagemans, 1999), the visible surface of a full-fledged three-
dimensional object can complete amodally into the entire boundary surface of a volumetric surface. 
Thus, to borrow an example from van Lier (1999), “seeing” the backside of a tree-trunk can also be 
considered as an instance of amodal completion. 
 
The well-known Chicago multiplying billiard balls routine provides a good example of the role of 
amodal volume completion in magic (see Fig. 6)5. Here, the conjurer begins by holding a single ball 
between two of his fingers, which suddenly and apparently inexplicably turns into two balls (and so 
on). The essential secret behind the trick is that one of the balls is a hollow shell, from which the 
other one is conveniently produced. If you look at Fig. 6(a), you have an impression of four solid 
balls, but in reality, one of them is just a hollow shell (Fig. 6(b)).  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 6 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
                                                
4 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eDCHC01VVo, movie last accessed on Jan. 16th, 2016. 
5 See also http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seaO1c5awYw for a demonstration, movie last accessed on Jan. 16th, 
2016. 
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It is important to point out that the illusory experience of a complete ball persists even when you 
know it is actually just a semi-spherical shell. Indeed, using an empty shell such as the one used in 
this trick, you can even create a compelling illusion where the shell seems to morph into complete 
ball while you hold it in your hand simply by lifting it off a table (Ekroll, Sayim & Wagemans, 
2013). Furthermore, putting your finger into such a semi-spherical shell does not ruin the perceptual 
impression of a complete ball. Rather, it leads to an illusion of bodily awareness, in which the finger 
feels shorter, as if to make space for the illusory volume of the ball (Ekroll et al., 2016). This 
strength of the tendency to immediately experience the shell as a complete ball neatly explains why 
it is very difficult to debunk this trick, even after repeated viewings (Danek, Fraps, von Müller, 
Grothe, & Öllinger, 2014).  
 
Amodal absence 
As already mentioned, extant theories of amodal completion appeal to various more or less literal 
incarnations of the idea that the visual system somehow completes the directly visible parts of 
objects via some kind of extrapolation of contours, surfaces or volumes.  Hence, the traditional term 
amodal completion seems quite apt. However, an intriguing and rather rude illusion recently 
circulating on the internet suggest that this idea might fall short of capturing all of the relevant 
phenomena and this may have interesting implications for our understanding of how many magic 
tricks work. We are referring to the illusion of “amodal nudity” (e.g. Hill, 2013; Bonnet, 2013) 
where various bathing-suit models look strikingly naked, although they are actually wearing proper 
attire, which just happens to be occluded. Various blog posts on the internet (e.g. Hill, 2013) will try 
to convince you that this effect has something to do with your dirty mind, but this “theory” is easily 
disproven. As illustrated in Fig. 7, essentially the same effect can be achieved with considerably less 
erotic material, such as a cluttered office desk. Notice how difficult it is to imagine that the clutter 
on the office desk (Fig. 7(a)) is really there behind the “bubbled” occluder (Fig. 7(b)). To appreciate 
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the striking nature of this illusion even better, do the following experiment. First look at the 
unoccluded picture (Fig. 7(a)), close your eyes and try to imagine the clutter on the desk before 
your “inner eye”. Now, repeat the experiment, but rather than closing your eyes, look at the 
occluded version of the picture (Fig. 7(b)) while you try to imagine the clutter behind the occluder. 
You will probably find that the latter is considerably more difficult. Thus, it would seem that merely 
viewing the occluder somehow interferes with your ability to imagine things behind it (even things 
you know are actually there). The demonstration in Fig. 8 shows that an object which is expected to 
be there based on high-level expectations can also be experienced as curiously “absent” when it is 
hidden behind and aptly positioned occluder6. This shows that we are dealing with some kind of 
active perceptual suppression rather than a mere failure to represent invisible things.7 
Even though this effect is rather counter-intuitive, it is not difficult to explain in terms of general 
heuristics known to play a central role in perceptual processing. The basic idea is that the perceptual 
system tends to avoid interpretations of the visual input that involve unlikely coincidences and 
alignments along the line of sight (Biederman, 1987; Freeman, 1994). In this case, the interpretation 
that the clutter is really there behind the occluder would mean that all of the clutter is positioned 
such that it is covered by the few and rather small hiding places actually provided by the occluder, 
which is highly unlikely to happen by chance. Even small displacements of the occluder or the 
clutter would make parts of the clutter visible. Hence, the perceptual system seems to discard the 
possibility that the clutter is actually there behind the occluder.  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 7 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 8 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
                                                
6 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, a factor that may make it difficult to imagine the objects in Fig. 7(a) as 
hidden behind the ”bubbled” occluder in Fig. 7(b) is that they are perceived as larger than the relevant parts of the 
”bubbled” occluder (which is experienced as being located in the foreground) due to size-distance invariance 
(Emmert’s law, see Holway & Boring, 1941). It is a simple geometrical fact that a small object in the foreground 
can occlude the view of a much larger one in the background provided that it is sufficiently far away, but it may be 
untuitively difficult to imagine this.   
7 This may also explain the curious experience evoked by viewing a face covered by an apple in Magritte’s well-known 
painting “The Son of Man”, where there is “a sort of conflict […] between the visible that is hidden and the visible 
that is present” (Torczyner & Magritte, 1977, p. 172). 
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This phenomenon is similar to the amodal presence of the hidden parts of the B’s in Fig. 1(b) in the 
sense that both phenomena are positively different from not having any particular perceptual 
experience at all (which one might presume to be the case because there is no corresponding 
sensory input).  At the same time, the two phenomena also seem to be complementary in two 
respects. While the perceptual system produces a positive and specific percept in Fig. 1(b), it seems 
to produce a negative and unspecific percept in Fig. 7(b). In order to highlight both the similarity 
and the complementarity vis-à-vis the well-known phenomenon of amodal presence, we propose to 
refer to the new phenomenon as “amodal absence”. To emphasize that “amodal absence” is different 
from the mere lack of any particular perceptual experience (due to a lack of direct sensory input), 
we may refer to the latter as modal absence. While total occlusion will always imply that no 
perceptual objects are instantiated (they are modally absent), amodal absence means that an abstract 
set (see below) of possible objects which could, in principle, be hiding behind the occluder, is 
actively excluded by the perceptual system.  
Clearly, when one looks at Fig. 7(b), it is not only the particular objects in Fig. 7 (a) that are 
amodally absent, but also a larger set of other logically conceivable possibilities. But exactly how 
large is this set, and how can it be characterized? An extreme hypothesis would be that the 
perceptual system excludes every logically possible object that may ie hidden behind the occluder. 
On this hypothesis, the phenomenon of amodal absence could be described as some kind of amodal 
completion of empty space. This extreme hypothesis seems implausible, though, because it would 
make little sense for the visual system to categorically exclude the far from unlikely possibility that 
some object may lie hidden behind the occluders. A more plausible hypothesis, therefore, is that it 
excludes some, but not all of the possibilities. This idea can be appreciated by considering van 
Lier’s (1999) demonstration of ‘fuzzy’ amodal completion (Fig. 9). The different alternatives B1-B3 
all look like plausible completions of the partially occluded shape in panel A, but the different 
alternatives C1-C3 do not.  In our terminology, one may say that the alternatives B1-B3 are all to 
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some extent amodally present, while the alternatives C1-C3 are to some extent amodally absent.  
 
As illustrated in Fig. 10, classical amodal completion, van Lier’s (1999) fuzzy amodal completion, 
and the perceptually even more unspecific experience of amodal absence (Fig. 7(b)) can all be 
regarded as resulting from the same overarching logic of inference operating at different levels of 
stimulus ambiguity. In the example of classical amodal completion (Fig. 7(a)), the perceptual 
experience is highly specific because the highly regular visible part provides strong cues to the 
shape of the hidden part. In the example of fuzzy amodal completion (Fig. 7(b)), the visible part is 
still available, but provides a poorer basis for perceptual inference because it is less regular, which 
results in a less well-specified percept. In the example of amodal absence (Fig. 7(c)), there is no 
visible part, but some limited form of perceptual inference is still possible based on the size and 
shape of the occluder itself. Although an object of the same (retinal) size and shape as the occluder 
can, in principle, be hidden behind the occluder, this necessarily requires a perfect alignment of the 
occluder and the hidden object along the line of sight, which is highly unlikely to happen by chance 
in a natural real-world scene. The smaller an object is relative to the occluder, however, the more 
likely it becomes that it could have become totally hidden behind the occlude by mere chance. 
Thus, based on the well-known idea that the perceptual system tends to avoid interpretations 
involving unlikely coincidences (Rock, 1983; Biederman, 1987; Freeman, 1994) we may speculate 
that amodal absence does not involve the perceptual exclusion of all possible objects, but only those 
which are particularly unlikely based on cues such as their size and shape relative to the occluder. 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 9 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 10 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
This kind of amodal absence may play an important role in many magical tricks. Consider, for 
instance, a trick where the magician shows an empty palm and then, with a swift flick of the wrist, 
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seems to grab a coin out of thin air. The simple secret behind this trick is that the coin is kept hidden 
behind the magician’s thumb (Fig. 11). During the quick flick of the wrist, it is simply pulled out 
using the index and middle finger. It is clear that this trick involves some misdirection. The small 
movements of the fingers tend to go unnoticed because of the much larger movements of the hand 
(Hergovich, Gröbl, & Carbon, 2011) and the magician might look into the air to direct attention 
away from the hand during the critical move. However, the belief that the hand was actually empty 
before the critical move may be significantly reinforced by the kind of amodal absence also evident 
in the “tidy-up-your desk illusion” (Fig. 7). In this case, too, accidental alignment (of the coin and 
the thumb) along the line of sight is presumably the driving principle. From the perspective of the 
magician, it is easy to see the significance of the elements of misdirection elements involved in this 
trick, because he or she actively performs them. It may be less obvious, however, that the clever 
hiding of the coin not only hides the coin, but also produces a compelling impression of absence 
which adds to the overall robustness and strength of the routine.  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 11 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
In the above, we have only considered the phenomenon of amodal absence in connection with static 
configurations. As beautifully illustrated by Richard Wiseman’s video clip “The Ball”8 dynamic 
cases of accidental alignment between the occluder and the hidden object seem to evoke even more 
impressive experiences of amodal absence. This can be regarded as a straightforward consequence 
of the increased level of accidentalness introduced by the carefully coordinated motion of the 
occluder and the hidden object.  
Gibson (1982) has argued that a key aspect of the materialization and vanishing of objects typical of 
so many tricks is that the magician somehow hides the visible optical transitions (such as accretion 
and deletion), which normally occur when a hidden object becomes disoccluded or a visible one 
                                                
8 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sIQ_8bIco3s, movie last accessed on Jan. 16th, 2016. 
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becomes occluded. This is undoubtedly the case, and the above coin example may be regarded as a 
case in point, where the gradual accretion of the hidden coin is hidden by means of misdirection. 
However, our analysis suggests that another significant factor may also be involved: The illusion of 
amodal absence. 
In the above, we have introduced the term amodal absence to describe the compelling perceptual 
experience that “something is not there”, as in Figs. 7 and 8. We conceive of this term as directly 
analogous and complementary to the established term amodal presence, which refers to the 
compelling perceptual experience that “something is there”, as in Fig. 1. Amodal presence has 
hitherto only been discussed in connection with cases of partial occlusion, while we have primarily 
used examples involving total occlusion to demonstrate the phenomenon of amodal absence. This 
should not be taken to imply that amodal absence is limited to cases of total occlusion. Van Lier’s 
(1999) fuzzy amodal completion (Figs. 9 and 10), for instance, clearly illustrates how cases 
involving partial occlusion can evoke both “amodal absence” and “amodal presence” and that they 
may be regarded as two sides of the same coin.  
Magic, problem solving and visual fixedness 
Trying to find out how a magical trick works can be considered as a problem-solving task (Danek, 
Fraps, von Müller, Grothe, & Öllinger, 2014). For magic to be effective, it is obviously of 
paramount importance that this problem-solving process is unsuccessful. The reader may be 
familiar with Duncker’s (1945) classical idea of functional fixedness as an important factor 
impeding effective problem-solving. It is probably less well known, though, that Duncker (1945, p. 
85) also related his general concept of “fixedness” to “factors such as visual organization”. For 
instance, he pointed out that a “chimpanzee who stands in need of a stick (something long, firm …) 
sometimes has difficulties in recognizing the stick in a branch still growing on the tree, in seeing it 
as a percept apart […]. On the tree is a ‘branch’, a part of the figural unit ‘tree’, and this part-
character—more generally, this ‘fixedness’—is clearly responsible for the fact that to a search for 
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something like a stick, the branch is less ‘within reach’ than the branch on the ground.” (p. 85). Fig. 
12 provides a compelling demonstration of Duncker’s point: Notice how difficult it is to recognize 
that the box in panel (a) is actually part of the ‘grid’ in panel (b).  
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 12 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
We believe that this line of thinking is very useful for understanding many aspects of magic in 
general, and the great robustness of tricks based on amodal perception (i.e. amodal completion or 
amodal absence) in particular. It is difficult for us to see the visible parts of objects in their own 
right, because after visual organization has taken place, they are but mere parts of more 
comprehensive figural units (Gestalts), like a complete ball with a backside, a complete spoon or an 
unbroken blade. From this perspective, it is easy to see why it is so difficult to debunk tricks based 
on amodal perception: In order to find out what is going on, the spectator has to consciously 
disregard the visual organization imposed by the perceptual system and mentally organize the visual 
input in a different way. Visual organization is a biologically important factor that, for the most part, 
allows us to make sense of the noisy, ambiguous and incomplete visual input actually available at 
our retinae (Koffka, 1935) and normally, there is no need to consciously reorganize the structure 
imposed by our visual system. Only in exceptional cases (like in magic tricks), the very same visual 
organization can backfire and also lead to misleading illusions. 
 
 
Cognitive impenetrability  
Visual fixedness may be thought of as a consequence of the cognitive impenetrability of perceptual 
processes (Pylyshyn, 1999; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Consider the lightness illusion in Fig. 13. 
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Although you may find it difficult to believe, the chess figures in the top row are identical to the 
ones in the bottom row. The only reason why the upper figures look white while the lower figures 
look black is that they are viewed in different contexts (Anderson & Winawer, 2005; see also 
Adelson, 2000 and Gilchrist et al., 1999 for similar demonstrations). Importantly, even when you 
know that the figures are actually identical, they still look very different (white and black, 
respectively). Several authors have argued that amodal completion is independent of conscious 
knowledge (i.e. cognitively impenetrable) in much the same way as this lightness illusion (Michotte 
et al. 1964/1991; Kanizsa, 1979; 1985; Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1999). Some effects of 
learning and knowledge on our mental processing of occluded objects have been documented, 
(Vrins et al., 2009, Hazenberg et al., 2014, Hazenberg & van Lier, 2015), but it can be discussed 
whether these effects are part of what should be called amodal perception proper. Importantly, 
amodal perception is clearly less cognitively penetrable than attention, because endogenously-
controlled attention can be voluntarily directed (Pylyshyn, 1999). This suggests that it should be 
even more difficult to debunk tricks based on amodal perception than tricks based on attentional 
misdirection. When people try to debunk a trick based on amodal perception, the cognitively 
impenetrable illusion (or visual fixedness) closes the door to the right solution even before any 
conscious problem-solving even starts. 
 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX        Figure 13 about here XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Ortiz (2006, p. 37; see also Leddington, in press) has argued that magic “can only be established by 
a process of elimination”9. The properties of perceptual mechanisms make them seem perfectly 
suited for achieving this: One of the hallmarks of perception is that it tends to provide unique 
interpretations of the highly ambiguous sensory input (Hoffman, 2000). That is, the perceptual 
                                                
9 “Magic can only be established by a process of elimination. There is no way that you can directly apprehend that 
you’re witnessing magic. You conclude that it’s magic because there is no alternative. Therefore, the primary task in 
giving someone the experience of witnessing magic is to eliminate every other possible cause.” (Ortiz, 2006, p. 37). 
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process typically involves the automatic, cognitively impenetrable, and essentially instantaneous 
elimination of a large (often infinite) set of alternative interpretations of the sensory input.  
Magicians also often highlight the importance of setting up misleading assumptions and 
expectations in order to conceal the method behind a trick (Ortiz, 2006; Kuhn et al., 2014). Visual 
fixedness and the cognitive impenetrability of perceptual mechanisms may be regarded as an 
extreme form of this kind of generation of false assumptions that may be critical to the robustness 
and potency of many magic tricks. Importantly, the assumptions made by the visual system are not 
consciously made, making sure that the spectator never even suspects that their assumptions have 
been tampered with. 
Duncker’s (1945) concept of “visual fixedness” can be understood in two slightly different ways. 
We have highlighted how it may be a good metaphor for how cognitively impenetrable perceptual 
processes can impede conscious reasoning by automatically excluding the true explanation of a 
trick. On this reading, Duncker’s concept of “visual fixedness” would not be entirely analogous to 
his concept of “functional fixedness”, because the latter refers more to a learned (and potentially 
reversible) habit of thought than a perceptual process which is cognitively impenetrable in the 
absolute sense. We believe that the examples we have been considering are best understood as 
resulting from visual fixation in the former sense, but it may also be possible that some processes 
more akin to functional fixation in the second sense play a role in both perception and magic. 
In the present paper, we have focused on demonstrating how amodal perception plays an important 
role in creating strong magic by virtue of being due to cognitively impenetrable perceptual 
mechanisms. Given that inferences about hidden things go far beyond the directly available sensory 
input, it may appear rather counterintuitive that it is partly based on perceptual mechanisms, but the 
potency of amodal perception in producing strong magic suggests that this is nevertheless the case. 
On a more general level, we believe that analogous lines of reasoning may help to further flesh out 
the role of genuinely perceptual mechanisms in making inferences about causality (Duncker, 1945, 
pp. 66-67; Michotte, 1963; Leslie, 1988; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Ortiz, 2006, p. 54.), actions and 
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intentions (Scholl, & Gao, 2013; Van de Cruys et al., 2015) or even realness (Michotte, 1991; 
Mausfeld, 2013; Vishwanath, 2013, 2014; Leddington, in press). Importantly, one could argue that it 
is the automatic nature of amodal perception that makes such a potent tool for creating robust and 
surprising magical effects. On this view, not only amodal completion, but perceptual processes in 
general can be expected to be particularly potent factors in magic (Ekroll & Wagemans, 2016).  
According to a golden rule often appealed to by magicians, one should never repeat the same trick 
twice to avoid that the spectators notice how the trick works. In the case of tricks relying on 
attentional misdirection, this obviously makes sense. If, however, a trick is based on a cognitively 
impenetrable perceptual illusion, one would expect that it can be repeated essentially ad libitum. 
The only potential adverse effect of repeating the trick would be that the spectators gain more time 
to think, but even then the chances of figuring out how it works should be rather slim due to visual 
fixedness. Based on this reasoning, investigating the effect of repeated presentations of magic tricks 
on the spectators’ likelihood of figuring out the method could be a promising tool for elucidating the 
nature of the mechanisms underlying different kinds of magic tricks. Recently, for instance, Cui et 
al. (2011) showed that a sleight-of-hand illusion traditionally believed to be based on social 
attentional misdirection is very resilient to repeated presentations, which may be taken to suggest 
that more automatic perceptual mechanisms are at play.  
In terms of the taxonomy of misdirection recently proposed by Kuhn et al. (2014), magic based on 
amodal perception and other cognitively impenetrable perceptual effects fit nicely into the category 
of non-attentional perceptual misdirection. The present analysis is also consistent with their 
observation that magic based on “non-attentional perceptual mechanisms is more resilient to the 
spectator’s own intentions” (p. 7) than magic based on attentional misdirection.  
 
 
Failures of visual metacognition as a key factor in magic 
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In the introduction, we pointed out that the kind of inattentional blindness and/or change blindness 
that plays a central role in many magic tricks involves a systematic failure of visual metacognition, 
where spectators have unrealistic intuitions about how much they actually see. Our immediate 
phenomenology conjures up the misleading impression that our visual system does much more for 
us than it actually does. Interestingly, one may argue that amodal perception involves a similar 
systematic failure of visual metacognition. In this case, though, our immediate phenomenology 
conjures up the misleading impression that our visual system does much less for us than it actually 
does.  We have a compelling impression of not being able to see hidden things, but the phenomena 
of amodal perception suggest that we actually do, at least in a functional sense. Thus, magicians can 
make the spectators see something that is not really there, while they are confident that they would 
only be seeing it if it were really there. 
We believe that these failures of visual metacognition are essential for creating strong magical 
experiences because they make it almost impossible for the spectators to even suspect that they are 
being fooled. Hence, on a general level, one may argue that while attention and amodal perception 
are quite disparate phenomena in their own right, they both involve failures of visual metacognition, 
which accounts for their exceptional potency as tools for generating strong and robust magical 
experiences. In an even more general vein, it may prove rewarding to explore the hypothesis that 
also many other types of magic effects are based on analogous failures of visual metacognition that 
have yet to be systematically discussed and characterized. As discussed by Kuhn et al. (2014), an 
important feature of successful misdirection is that it should be counterintuitive. Relatedly, it is 
essential that the misdirection is not recognized as such. Yelling “look over there, a gorilla on a 
bike!” may distract people’s attention from a secret move, but it is obviously not a very good recipe 
for strong magic. Relying on a failure of visual metacognition, on the other hand, ensures both that 
the misdirection is counterintuitive (because failures of visual metacognition are counterintuitive) 
and that the misdirection is not recognized as such (because we are not consciously aware of our 
failures of visual metacognition). 
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As an example of a further counterintuitive aspect of perception that may qualify as a failure of 
visual metacognition, one may consider the perception of causality: While we naively tend to think 
that causality is inferred by conscious reasoning, there is ample evidence to suggest that it is also to 
a considerable extent experienced automatically based on perceptual mechanisms (Duncker, 1945, 
pp. 66-67; Michotte, 1963; Leslie, 1988; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Ortiz, 2006, p. 54.). 
 
Stupid tricks that fool most people most of the time: The role of psychological 
effects in magic  
Our explorations of the role of amodal perception in magic described in the present paper were 
largely motivated by a general and simple heuristic that we believe may be useful for identifying 
further aspects of magic of particular interest for cognitive science. The basic idea is this: If a 
magical trick involves an unknown but potent psychological (perceptual or cognitive) factor, it is 
likely to produce an effect which is more stunning than you would expect based on a description of 
how it is done. Thus, conversely, if a given magic trick exhibits such a discrepancy between the 
expected and the actual potency of the effect, this may point to hitherto unknown or underestimated 
perceptual or cognitive phenomena contributing to the magical effect. In fact, if you leaf through an 
arbitrary instructional book on magic, you will probably notice that many of the tricks seem to fall 
into this category. You will also notice that most descriptions of how to do a particular trick are 
preceded by a description of how the spectators experience the trick. Often, this description is quite 
indispensable because it is far from obvious how the often quite simple and seemingly “stupid” 
methods being described are sufficient for creating a strong magical experience. That even 
magicians often lack a true and complete understanding of how many tricks work is suggested by 
the aforementioned phenomenon of magician’s guilt, which is a topic of concern vigorously 
discussed among practicing magicians: The magician has the feeling that the method behind his 
trick is so blatantly obvious that it must be evident to everybody. However, the experienced 
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magician has one important advantage over the novice: Even if he does not really know why a 
particular trick works so well, he knows from experience that it will work like a charm.  
In summary, the strategy of looking for magic tricks which work much better than one would expect 
based on a description of the method may turn out to be very useful for uncovering unknown 
psychological factors in magic in general. 
Summary and conclusions 
We have argued that automatic perceptual and cognitive mechanisms governing how we experience 
and reason about hidden things – in particular those underlying the well-known phenomenon of 
amodal presence and the less well-known, but presumably intimately related phenomenon of 
amodal absence –play a central role in many magic tricks. We have also argued the causal role of 
these mechanisms, which cannot be observed directly, is difficult to appreciate even for experienced 
magicians, and that it may therefore have been largely neglected in discussions of how magic 
works. We have also suggested that the surprising discrepancy between the expected and the actual 
efficiency of many magical routines may serve as a tell-tale sign of interesting psychological effects 
that may help guide further research into the psychology of magic. 
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List of figure captions 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of amodal completion. When viewing panel (b) one automatically and 
effortlessly has the impression of complete B’s partially hidden behind the black “ink blot”, 
although only the fragments shown in panel (a) are directly visible. After Bregman (1981). 
 
 
Figure 2: (a,b) Demonstration of the Gestalt principle of good continuation. When the two patterns 
in (a) are displaced towards each other such that the curved segments are brought into register (b), a 
radical perceptual reorganization is experienced, where a curved wave pattern superimposed on a 
square wave pattern suddenly pops out (after Herzog, Otto, Boi, & Öğmen, 2012). (c) If you cover 
the central X-shaped part of the triangle (say, with your thumb) you will have the experience of a 
complete regular triangle (after Michotte et al. 1964/1991). The percept of a complete regular 
triangle can also be explained in terms the principle of “good continuation”: The perceptual 
completion of the contours is the smoothest and most natural continuation of the visible contours. 
(d) Similarly, if you cover up the central part of this figure, you will perceive a complete X.  
 
Figure 3: Illustration of how a magician may rely on amodal completion to create a stunning 
illusion of spoon bending. First, the conjurer presents a seemingly complete and straight spoon (a), 
which then gradually bends (b). After the bending is complete (c), the magician pulls the bent spoon 
out of his hand and hands it to a memb r of the audience. As shown in (d), the spoon was actually 
bent from the very start, but a spare spoon handle is held in alignment with the head of the spoon. 
Since the gap between the head of the bent spoon and the spare handle is hidden by the finger, the 
spectator believes to see a single unbroken straight spoon. The illusion that the spoon is bending is 
created by letting the spare handle fall slowly into the palm of the hand (e). Afterwards, the bent 
spoon is pulled out of the hand and handed to a member of the audience (f), while the spare handle 
is kept hidden in the hand. Since the audience will be very occupied with examining the bent spoon, 
it is very easy to get rid of the spare handle without being noticed. 
 
Figure 4: The main principle underlying the Chinese linking ring routine. One of the rings has a 
small opening (a), but when the opening is covered by the magician’s fingers, the ring looks 
complete (b).  
 
Figure 5: (a) The simple explanation behind the knife-through-arm trick is a hole in the blade. (b) 
When the arm is put into the hole, the knife appears to penetrate the arm, rather than the other way 
around.(c) Using essentially the same trick, it is also possible to create the illusion that a banana 
penetrates a brick (from Gerbino & Zabai, 2003).  
 
Figure 6: In the Chicago multiplying balls trick, the conjurer starts with a single ball held between 
his thumb and index finger, and successively makes additional balls appear until he ends up with 
showing four balls, as in panel (a). The main secret behind the trick is that the “ball” kept between 
the thumb and the index finger is actually just an empty semi-spherical shell (top of panel (b)) in 
which a second ball can be hidden. At the beginning of the routine, one complete ball is hidden in 
the shell. Using the middle finger, this ball is then flipped out of the shell and held between the 
index finger and the middle finger. After having produced this basic illusion, more balls can be 
produced by surreptitiously loading new balls into the shell while pretending to move the upper ball 
one step up in the “ladder” of fingers using the other hand. Then, the newly loaded ball can be 
produced from the shell in the same way as before. 
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Figure 7: A demonstration of “amodal absence” inspired by a currently popular “visual joke” 
circulating in social media called “amodal nudity” or “bubble porn” (e.g. Hill, 2013; Bonnet, 2013). 
In panel (b), the objects on the table are occluded by a violet “bubbled” occluder. Note how difficult 
it is to imagine that the objects in (a) are really hidden behind the “bubbled” occluder in (b). 
 
Figure 8: Although high-level knowledge makes us expect the middle finger to be there behind the 
banana, it is still experienced as curiously absent. 
 
Figure 9: The shapes B1-B3 and C1-C3 are all logically possible completions of the partially 
occluded shape A. Some of them (B1-B3) are experienced as likely, while others (C1-C3) are 
experienced as unlikely. Thus, the perceptual representation of the hidden parts of the shape may be 
better conceived of as a set of possible shapes rather than a specific one. Reprinted from Acta 
Psychologica, 102(2), van Lier, R., Investigating global effects in visual occlusion: From a partly 
occluded square to the back of a tree-trunk. Pp. 203-220, Copyright (1999), with permission from 
Elsevier. 
 
Figure 10: Illustration of how the perceptual system may generate increasingly fuzzy 
representations of occluded scene regions as the ambiguity of the stimulus increases. (a) The most 
well-known type of amodal completion. Here, the visual system creates a rather specific 
representation of the parts of the scene hidden behind the square: The visual system creates a 
representation which encompasses just a small subset (green disk) of the set of logically possible 
interpretations (dotted circle). (b) A more fuzzy kind of amodal completion (van Lier, 1999), where 
the visual system creates a representation encompassing a larger subset of the logically possible 
options. (c) In the case of total occlusion, the stimulus is even more ambiguous, but the visual 
system may create a representation which, although it is very fuzzy and unspecific, is more specific 
than the set of logically possible options. Hence, some of the logically possible representations 
would be eliminated by the visual system. 
 
Figure 11: Simple coin production. The magician shows a seemingly empty hand, as in (a), and 
grasps a coin out of thin air. In reality, the coin is kept behind the thumb to begin with, as shown in 
(b). 
 
Figure 12: An example of “visual fixedness”: It is very difficult to see that the box in (a) is actually 
a part of the figure in (b). After Koffka (1935). 
 
Figure 13: The chess figures on the top and on the bottom are actually identical, but the ones on top 
look white, while those at the bottom look black. Note that this illusion does not go away even 
though you know that the figures are in fact equal. You can verify this by covering up the surrounds. 
Reprinted by permission from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature, Anderson, B. L., & Winawer, J. 
Image segmentation and lightness perception. Nature, 434(7029), 79-83, copyright (2005). 
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Figure 1: An example of amodal completion. When viewing panel (b) one automatically and effortlessly has 
the impression of complete B’s partially hidden behind the black “ink blot”, although only the fragments 
shown in panel (a) are directly visible. After Bregman (1981).  
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Figure 2: (a,b) Demonstration of the Gestalt principle of good continuation. When the two patterns in (a) are 
displaced towards each other such that the curved segments are brought into register (b), a radical 
perceptual reorganization is experienced, where a curved wave pattern superimposed on a square wave 
pattern suddenly pops out (after Herzog, Otto, Boi, & Öğmen, 2012). (c) If you cover the central X-shaped 
part of the triangle (say, with your thumb) you will have the experience of a complete regular triangle (after 
Michotte et al. 1964/1991). The percept of a complete regular triangle can also be explained in terms the 
principle of “good continuation”: The perceptual completion of the contours is the smoothest and most 
natural continuation of the visible contours. (d) Similarly, if you cover up the central part of this figure, you 
will perceive a complete X.  
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Figure 3: Illustration of how a magician may rely on amodal completion to create a stunning illusion of 
spoon bending. First, the conjurer presents a seemingly complete and straight spoon (a), which then 
gradually bends (b). After the bending is complete (c), the magician pulls the bent spoon out of his hand 
and hands it to a member of the audience. As shown in (d), the spoon was actually bent from the very start, 
but a spare spoon handle is held in alignment with the head of the spoon. Since the gap between the head 
of the bent spoon and the spare handle is hidden by the finger, the spectator believes to see a single 
unbroken straight spoon. The illusion that the spoon is bending is created by letting the spare handle fall 
slowly into the palm of the hand (e). Afterwards, the bent spoon is pulled out of the hand and handed to a 
member of the audience (f), while the spare handle is kept hidden in the hand. Since the audience will be 
very occupied with examining the bent spoon, it is very easy to get rid of the spare handle without being 
noticed.  
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Figure 4: The main principle underlying the Chinese linking ring routine. One of the rings has a small 
opening (a), but when the opening is covered by the magician’s fingers, the ring looks complete (b).  
158x90mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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Figure 5: (a) The simple explanation behind the knife-through-arm trick is a hole in the blade. (b) When the 
arm is put into the hole, the knife appears to penetrate the arm, rather than the other way around.(c) Using 
essentially the same trick, it is also possible to create the illusion that a banana penetrates a brick (from 
Gerbino & Zabai, 2003).  
158x79mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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Figure 6: In the Chicago multiplying balls trick, the conjurer starts with a single ball held between his thumb 
and index finger, and successively makes additional balls appear until he ends up with showing four balls, as 
in panel (a). The main secret behind the trick is that the “ball” kept between the thumb and the index finger 
is actually just an empty semi-spherical shell (top of panel (b)) in which a second ball can be hidden. At the 
beginning of the routine, one complete ball is hidden in the shell. Using the middle finger, this ball is then 
flipped out of the shell and held between the index finger and the middle finger. After having produced this 
basic illusion, more balls can be produced by surreptitiously loading new balls into the shell while pretending 
to move the upper ball one step up in the “ladder” of fingers using the other hand. Then, the newly loaded 
ball can be produced from the shell in the same way as before.  
158x79mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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Figure 7: A demonstration of “amodal absence” inspired by a currently popular “visual joke” circulating in 
social media called “amodal nudity” or “bubble porn” (e.g. Hill, 2013; Bonnet, 2013). In panel (b), the 
objects on the table are occluded by a violet “bubbled” occluder. Note how difficult it is to imagine that the 
objects in (a) are really hidden behind the “bubbled” occluder in (b).  
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Figure 8: Although high-level knowledge makes us expect the middle finger to be there behind the banana, 
it is still experienced as curiously absent.  
165x156mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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Figure 9: The shapes B1-B3 and C1-C3 are all logically possible completions of the partially occluded shape 
A. Some of them (B1-B3) are experienced as likely, while others (C1-C3) are experienced as unlikely. Thus, 
the perceptual representation of the hidden parts of the shape may be better conceived of as a set of 
possible shapes rather than a specific one. Reprinted from Acta Psychologica, 102(2), van Lier, R., 
Investigating global effects in visual occlusion: From a partly occluded square to the back of a tree-trunk. 
Pp. 203-220, Copyright (1999), with permission from Elsevier.  
340x138mm (72 x 72 DPI)  
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Figure 10: Illustration of how the perceptual system may generate increasingly fuzzy representations of 
occluded scene regions as the ambiguity of the stimulus increases. (a) The most well-known type of amodal 
completion. Here, the visual system creates a rather specific representation of the parts of the scene hidden 
behind the square: The visual system creates a representation which encompasses just a small subset 
(green disk) of the set of logically possible interpretations (dotted circle). (b) A more fuzzy kind of amodal 
completion (van Lier, 1999), where the visual system creates a representation encompassing a larger subset 
of the logically possible options. (c) In the case of total occlusion, the stimulus is even more ambiguous, but 
the visual system may create a representation which, although it is very fuzzy and unspecific, is more 
specific than the set of logically possible options. Hence, some of the logically possible representations would 
be eliminated by the visual system.  
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Figure 11: Simple coin production. The magician shows a seemingly empty hand, as in (a), and grasps a 
coin out of thin air. In reality, the coin is kept behind the thumb to begin with, as shown in (b).  
158x79mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
 
 
Page 42 of 44Perspectives on Psychological Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
  
 
 
Figure 12: An example of “visual fixedness”: It is very difficult to see that the box in (a) is actually a part of 
the figure in (b). After Koffka (1935).  
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Figure 13: The chess figures on the top and on the bottom are actually identical, but the ones on top look 
white, while those at the bottom look black. Note that this illusion does not go away even though you know 
that the figures are in fact equal. You can verify this by covering up the surrounds. Reprinted by permission 
from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Nature, Anderson, B. L., & Winawer, J. Image segmentation and lightness 
perception. Nature, 434(7029), 79-83, copyright (2005).  
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